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The Case of Chinese Automobile Industry
Grace Chun Guo
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Qin Yang

I

n recent decades many emerging markets (EMFs) have
undertaken entrepreneurial transformations to adapt to
institutional transition and industrial change. Corporate
entrepreneurship (CE) provided EMFs viable ways to revitalize,
reconfigure, and transform successfully with the dynamic
environment. Although previous research examined
government roles on EMFs’ CE activities, little is known about
the mechanisms of how government exerts influence on
CE activities. To fully understand CE of EMFs, we propose a
stage model to explore specific roles governments play that
affect CE activities over time. In particular, we investigate how
governments’ grabbing hand, helping hand, and invisible
hand roles affected Chinese auto firms’ CE activities at
different stages from 1980 to 2016. Government involvement
is summarized and the advantages and disadvantages of
these roles are analyzed.
Keywords: corporate entrepreneurship; government
roles; innovation; venturing; emerging market; Chinese
automobile industry
Existing research has extensively examined how
emerging market firms (EMFs) have grown and become
important players in world business (e.g., Jiang et al., 2016;
Kotabe, Jiang, and Murray, 2017; Li and Kozhikode, 2008;
Mathews, 2006). In particular, EMFs have undertaken
entrepreneurial transformations to adapt to institutional
transition and industrial change (Yiu and Lau, 2008).
Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) provided EMFs viable
ways to revitalize, reconfigure, and transform successfully
with external environment (e.g., Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez,
and Hitt, 2000). CE activities such as innovation, strategic
renewal, and corporate venturing (Covin and Slevin, 1991)
are critical for EMFs to venture internationally (Wang, Hong,
Kafourors, and Wright, 2012; Yiu, Lau, and Bruton, 2007) and
gain competitive advantages in fierce domestic and global
competition.
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A firm’s ability to engage in CE is not only determined
by its available resources (Covin and Slevin, 1991) and
dynamic capabilities (Zahra and George, 2002), but also
by its embedded institutional environments. Institutional
environments can influence firms’ strategic activities
(Kotabe et al., 2017) and can shape the nature and level
of innovation in a country (Busenitz, Gomez, and Spencer,
2000). Among institutional forces, government plays
important roles in fostering entrepreneurial activities
(Minniti, 2008) through initiating policies, providing support,
and regulating industrial development (Kotabe et al., 2017).
EMFs differ from their counterparts in developed
countries in their lack of valuable resources and
capabilities (Yiu and Lau, 2008). To address their resources
insufficiency, EMFs are found to rely on preferential
treatment from the government to achieve business
success (Luo, 2000). Governments could be involved in
providing entrepreneurial opportunities for EMFs to access
valuable resources and to enhance firm capabilities. As
such, there are notable differences between EMFs and
developed market firms (DMFs) in conducting CE activities
(Kotabe et al., 2017).
Although previous research examined that the
fundamental question of whether government policies
have positive effect on entrepreneurial activities (Minniti,
2008), little is known about how governments matter in
EMFs’ CE activities. Drawing on previous models (Frye and
Shleifer’s 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 2002) of governments’
roles, we propose the following two research questions
to examine government’s involvement in promoting
CE activities in transition economies. First, what roles do
governments play in enabling and stimulating firms’ CE
in emerging economies? Second, what is the impact of
government involvement on important CE outcomes,
namely EMFs’ innovation, strategic renewal, and corporate
venturing? We adopted a case study approach (Eisenhardt,
1989; Yin, 1994) to our inquiry. We chose the automobile
industry in China as our research context because China
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has become the world’s largest and fastest-growing
emerging economy and its automobile industry has been
the largest in the world measured by unit production
since 2008. Under the strong influence of the government,
most Chinese automobile enterprises have undergone an
entrepreneurial transformation in order to compete locally
and globally, especially after China’s entry into the World
Trade Organization (Peng, 2003; Tan, 2007).
In this article, we provide a literature review of CE and
describe government’s roles in transition economies based
on Frye and Shleifer’s (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (2002).
We then analyze Chinese government’s involvement and
roles in the development of the automobile industry and
the CE activities of auto companies between the early
1980s to 2016. Lastly, we discuss outcomes of the Chinese
government’s involvement and provide implications for
theory and practice.

Theoretical Background
Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE)
CE is defined in various ways in the entrepreneurship
research. CE was viewed as the rebirth of organization
through a renewal (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). Zahra (1995,
1996) defines CE as a process of creating new businesses
or the strategic renewal of an existing business to improve
profitability and competitive advantages. CE requires firms
to engage in three distinct but related activities: innovation,
strategic renewal, and cooperate venturing (Zahra,
1996). First, innovation requires firms to develop cultures,
processes, and structures to support continuous new
product launches in its current markets as well as introduce
existing products into new markets (Covin and Miles, 1999).
Second, CE also embodies renewal activities that
enhance an enterprise’s ability to compete and take risks,
with or without the creation of new businesses. Strategic
renewal refers to the “revitalization of the company’s
operations by changing the scope of its business, its
competitive approach, or both” (Zahra, 1996: 1715). These
renewal activities may include opportunity identification
and exploitation as well as creating and sustaining a
competitive advantage through strategic renewal and
business model reconstruction. It can also include
organizational rejuvenation—a firm’s ability to improve its
internal processes, structures, and capabilities, to better
execute strategies and often involves administrative
innovations in human resource management (Covin and
Miles, 1999). Lastly, strategic renewal may also involve
domain redefinition—activities involving the creation of

new product market position that competitors have not
recognized or exploited (Covin and Miles, 1999). According
to Covin and Miles (1999), the focus of domain redefinition
is exploring for what is possible rather than exploiting what
is currently available.
Third, corporate venturing refers to activities that “seek
to generate new businesses for the corporation in which
it resides through the establishment of external or internal
corporate ventures” (Von Hippel, 1977: 163). Corporate
venturing can be divided into internal and external venturing
(Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, and Tan, 2009). Internal corporate
venturing involves the creation of new businesses that reside
within the corporate structure and preexisting organization
structures may accommodate these new ventures or newly
created organizational entities. External corporate venturing
involves investing in young, early growth-stage businesses
created by external parties through corporate venture capital,
licensing, acquisitions, and joint ventures.
In short, CE requires organizations to engage in
activities that continuously extend their domain of
competence and respond to risks and opportunities
through resource configuration and capability
development to meet changing customer demands
and competitor strategies (Guo et al., 2014). However, CE
activities do not occur in a vacuum and are under the
influence of institutional environments. National culture
(Hayton, George, and Zahra, 2002), accepted industry
norms and rules of engagement in competition (Covin
and Miles, 1999), and public policies as well as government
involvement (Wang et al., 2012) can exert strong influence
on firms’ ability and willingness to engage in CE activities.
Among institutional forces, government plays important
roles in fostering entrepreneurial activities (Minniti, 2008).
This is especially the case for firms in emerging economies
where institutional mechanisms are found to complement
firms’ activities (Kotabe et al., 2017) when their markets
have not reached the technological frontier (Mahmood
and Rufin, 2005) and EMFs have not fully developed their
competitive advantages to compete with their counterparts
from developed countries (Kotabe et al., 2017).
The following section introduces the stage models
of government roles in transition economies based on
Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and provides an analysis of
government’s involvement in and impact on CE activities
and industry development of the Chinese automobile
industry from the early 1980s to 2016.
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Government Roles and Institutional Influence
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2002), the impact of
governments on entrepreneurial activities in transition
economies can be described as the invisible hand, the
helping hand, and the grabbing hand models. Under
the invisible hand model, government restricts itself
to providing basic public goods, such as contract
enforcement, law and order, and some regulations.
Governments adopting invisible hands are generally
well organized, benevolent, and refrain from making
allocative decisions. Under the helping hand model,
government is actively involved in promoting economic
activities, establishing industry policies, and often has
close ties to entrepreneurs. In this model, government
has strong arbitrative power and leaves little room for the
legal framework. Lastly under the grabbing hand model,
government is considered interventionists; it remains
largely independent of courses and is empowered to
impose a variety of regulations on businesses.
An institution-based view suggests that firms’ strategic
choices are the outcome of the interaction between
organizations and institutions. While industry conditions,
firm resources, and capabilities can drive strategic choices,
formal and informal constraints of a particular institutional
environment can also exert strong influence. Based on
Kostova’s (1997) three-dimensional institutional profile,
a country’s level of entrepreneurship is determined by
government policies (regulatory dimension), shared
knowledge to establish new business (cognitive dimension),
and value system (normative dimension). Although
government’s influence on entrepreneurial activities is
mainly through public policies and regulations, or coercive
isomorphism in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) term, we
speculate that governments, especially those in transition
economies, can also shape the value system by imposing
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which
requires firms to abide by the norms or rules established
by the government for a specific profession or industry.
In addition, it is possible that governments in transition
economies, to address their political goals, can play an active
role in issuing favorable policies and allocating resources to
help construct a shared knowledge base for firms to engage
in entrepreneurial activities. In the next section, we apply
Frye and Shleifer (1997)’s framework and provide an analysis
of the Chinese government’s involvement and institutional
influence in reshaping the automobile industry.

8

Chinese Automobile Industry and
Government Involvement
Governments of a few major emerging economies, including
Brazil, India, and China, have successfully developed a viable
national automotive industry as one of the national economic
pillars (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2010). Even in these
countries, however, local automobile firms are still relatively
weak, and multinational firms will continue to dominate the
domestic industry for a long time (Chang, 2016; Guo, et al.,
2014). The difficulty of developing competitive automobile
enterprises in emerging economies is attributed to unique
institutional factors (e.g., heavy government regulations and
interventions in the automotive industry), an underdeveloped
supplier industry, underdeveloped intellectual property rights
(IPR) environment (Jiang, et al., 2011), and price-sensitive
domestic markets (Guo, et al. 2014)
The case of the Chinse automobile industry follows
the general development trajectory experienced by those
in other emerging economies. China surpassed the United
States in production of vehicles in 2008 (Guo, et al., 2014),
and the Chinese government succeeded in creating
the world’s largest automobile market with 24.5 million
units in 2015 (Chang, 2016). From 2000 to 2015, China’s
market share of auto production sextupled. In particular,
the market share at the worldwide auto production
almost doubled from 12 percent in 2007 to 23 percent in
2010 (Quest Trend Magazine). The two graphs in Figure 1
illustrate the growth trend of China’s auto industry.

Initiation Stage (Early 1980s to Late 1990s)
In the early 1980s, recognizing the lack of capital and
technological expertise of the local automobile makers,
Chinese political leaders established the country’s
passenger car production and an automotive supply chain.
In 1985, the government named the automobile industry
as one of its “pillar” industries (Roberto, Guo, and Jiang,
2011). To achieve these goals, the government encouraged
foreign direct investment and established laws that
forced international automakers into joint venture (JV)
arrangements. In 1994, the government developed the
China Automotive Industry Policy, which, for the first
time, set clear 50–50 JV requirements between Chinese
automakers and their foreign partners. To encourage
foreign direct investment (FDI), the government provided
favorable policies, such as a two-year tax exemption and a
three-year tax reduction for Sino-foreign firms.
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Figure 1. Growth Trend of China’s Auto Industry.
CHINA CAR PRODUCTION

3000000
2500000
2000000
UNITS

1500000
1000000
500000
0
2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Source: www.tradingeconomics.com | CAAM – China Association of Automobile Manufacturers

Global auto production grows by 50%, China’s share by sixfold since 2000
Index global auto production and China’s share 2000–2015 (2010 = 100)
130

30%
26,4% 27,0%

120
Global auto production

110

22,3%

China’s share at global auto production

22,9%

115,7

116,9

108,6

100
94,4

80
75,2

12,1%

72,6

25%
20%

100,0

90

70

23,5%

15%
13,1% 79,6

10%

60
5%
50

3,5%

0%

40
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: OICA – Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’ Automobiles 2016, www.oica.net.
Indexing, calculation of China’s share by Quest Research. Chart www.quest-trendmagazine.com

2012

2013

2014

2015

©Quest

THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT ON CHINESE FIRMS’ CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITIES

https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol20/iss1/1

9

4

Guo et al.: The Effect of Government Involvement on Chinese Firms' Corporate

The expectation behind such an arrangement was
that Chinese automakers would acquire technology and
know-how from their foreign partners, usually leading
international automakers. It can also improve local supply
industry with requirements of high rates of local content
(the percentage of auto parts purchased from local
suppliers in an assembly) (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010).
In exchange, foreign partners would gain access to the
vast Chinese car market. Such opportunities were greatly
welcomed by international automakers as the passenger
car markets in the industrialized market were approaching
saturation during that time (Chang, 2016). In addition,
the Chinese government believed that the 50–50 JV
arrangement would also prevent foreign automakers from
dominating the Chinese market. Even today, establishing
a wholly foreign-owned automobile enterprise in China
is prohibited (Chang, 2016). Consequently, firms such
as Volkswagen, Citroën, General Motors, and Ford all
partnered with domestic automakers. By the end of 1997,
China had about 500 FDI-involved automobile firms;
among these, 80 were assembly JVs and 410 were auto
parts JVs (Sit and Liu, 2000).
It is evident that during this early development stage,
the Chinese government adopted the grabbing hand
model. For instance, “in 1988, the government proposed a
strategy of supporting ‘three majors and three minors’—
with First Automobile Works (FAW), Second Automobile
Works (SAW), and Shanghai Automotive Industry
Corporation (SAIC) named as the three majors, and Beijing,
Tianjin, and Guangzhou firms as the three minors—to
limit the total number of firms, and provide a high degree
of protection.” (Chu, 2011: 1243). In addition, once the
Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Corporation (SVW) was
formed, the Shanghai government listed it as a “pillar firm” in
its development plan and provided preferential treatment
in taxation, foreign loans, exchange rates, and materials
procurement (Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman, 2006).
In addition, the government imposed coercive
pressure on Chinese and foreign automakers to jumpstart
the national automobile industry by imposing the 50–50
JV arrangement and banning foreign-owned automobile
enterprises in China. Despite the good intention, JV
partnerships are structured in a way that the Chinese firm
is mainly responsible for auto assembly operations and
the foreign partner is in charge of new car designs and
branding (Chang, 2016). In addition, Chinese automakers
did not form exclusive relationships with their foreign

10

partners. For example, SAIC had formed multiple joint
ventures, including Shanghai-Volkswagen, ShanghaiGeneral Motors, among others. Due to the nature of such
non-exclusive partnerships and to the concerns about
the country’s inadequate enforcement and enactment of
intellectual property protection, foreign automakers were
reluctant to share their full knowledge with their Chinese
partners (Guo et al., 2014; Roberto et al., 2011).
Furthermore, hierarchical control rather than market
relations determined the choices of suppliers. For example,
the Shanghai government formed a localization office, which
charged local suppliers’ products, financing, technology
adopted or imported. And the localization office requested
SVW to source from these firms (Sun et al., 2010). Further, high
tariffs and entry restrictions enabled the JVs to price cars high
and obtain high profits (Chu, 2011). Although such a strong
grabbing hand allowed rapid development of the Chinese
automakers and enabled them to acquire manufacturing
capabilities in a relatively short period of time, they have
not gained full access to closely guarded cutting-edge
technologies and R&D.
In short, during the period of early development, the
Chinese government’s strong grabbing hand, on the one
hand, allowed the weak Chinese automakers to pursue CE
transformation through corporate venturing by entering
the 50–50 JV arrangement with their foreign partners. On
the other hand, a high level of regulative pressure and the
nature of the JV arrangement also constrained Chinese
automakers’ ability to develop marketing capabilities as
well as new product development and independent
innovation capabilities.

Rapid Development Stage (Late 1990s to 2005)
Starting in the late 1990s, the institutional environment in
China experienced rapid and significant changes. Three
changes relevant to the automobile industry development
were the increasing power of industry ministries and local
(e.g., provincial) governments due to the gradual removal
of central planning mechanisms (Guo et al., 2014), China’s
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and
the rising household income along with improved road and
highway infrastructure in China. Previously auto consumers
were mainly institutions and taxi companies. However,
the increase of individual wealth fostered a segment with
price-sensitive consumers. Private auto ownership increased
around 22 percent annually from 1996 to 2005 (Chu, 2011).
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The more powerful industry ministries and local
governments gave birth to large automobile conglomerates
such as FAW and SAIC (Sit and Liu, 2000) as well as local
government-owned automakers such as Chery Auto. Today
there are a number of regional auto manufacturing hubs
in northern China, the central coast around Shanghai,
southern China, and western China (Chang, 2016). Although
these local governments provided strong support, which
has been crucial to the success of JVs with operations in
their region, they made it difficult for JV to be successful
in other regional markets (Chang, 2016). For instance, in
Shanghai, one will find more cars manufactured by SAIC’s
joint ventures with GM and Volkswagen, but many fewer
cars by Ford or Toyota whose JV operations are in northern
and southwestern China (Chang, 2016). In addition, the
Shanghai municipal government required that city taxis
be the Santana model from SVW. In 1996, the Shanghai
government banned cars with engine capacity lower than
1.6 liters to exclude Xiali cars (produced in Tianjin). In 1998,
it levied an extra $10,000 license fees on Citroën cars (ZX/
Fukang) made in Hubei province, and a lower license tax to
Santana buyers (Sun et al., 2010).
Second, the growth rate of the Chinese auto industry
accelerated rapidly after the country’s entry into the WTO
in 2001, which encouraged more foreign automakers in
the country (Roberto et al., 2011) and exposed domestic
automakers to fierce competition (Guo et al., 2014).
Lastly, rapid national economic growth, rising household
incomes, and the development of the highway and road
infrastructure throughout China also fueled consumer
demand for automobiles and fierce development of the
Chinese automobile industry. In 2009, China produced
10.38 million passenger cars, surpassing the United States
as the world’s largest manufacturer. The rising domestic
demand also gave birth to several independent automakers.
These newcomers to the industry and are not state-owned
enterprises. The most well-known independent automakers
in China are BYD Auto and Geely Auto.
Industry growth has been driven by rising domestic
demand and encouraged by supportive government policies.
During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the Chinese
government implemented generous incentives to drive
growth in the Chinese market. The stimulus package initially
applied only to small car models of engines below 1.6 liters,
but later in 2010 was expanded to include all passenger cars.
Incentives by the central government effectively encouraged
auto purchases despite the global economic downturn

(Roberto et al., 2011). And, auto distribution networks were
established hierarchically. For example, SVW vehicles flowed
from manufacturers to regional, provincial, municipal sales
agents, and then to retailers.
During the rapid development period, we believe the
Chinese government scaled back its regulative influence
and adopted the helping hand model, encouraging
Chinese auto firms to further their CE initiatives especially
through continuous strategy renewal. The Chinese
government did not exert strong coercive pressure
on auto firms but was actively involved in improving
overall road construction and highway infrastructure as
well as providing economic incentives to ensure auto
purchases during the global financial crisis. Government
at the central and the local levels also provided key
support for Chinese automakers’ strategic renewal. For
example, in our recent case study of Chang’an (Guo, et
al., 2014), one of China’s leading automakers, we found
that Chang’an was able to engage in a series of strategic
renewal activities by participating in national technology
development projects and by applying for national
innovation funds for improving R&D capabilities (e.g.,
upgrading R&D facilities and equipment), developing new
products (e.g., providing more financial support for lab
experiments), and conducting new technology research
(e.g., providing more financial support for international
collaboration). Compared with the grabbing hand model,
we consider the helping hand model effective during the
rapid industry growth stage as most automakers during
this period acquired state-of-the-art manufacturing
capabilities from their foreign partners and were able to
manufacture their own brands and those of their foreign
partners. Most Chinese automakers were in the process
of exploiting the existing and identifying new sources of
competitive advantages to face the fierce competition
especially after China’s entry into WTO. However, as
discussed earlier, the involvement of local government in
protecting the leading regional automakers has created a
scattered and fragmented Chinese auto industry.

Recent Transformation Stage (2006–Present)
The year 2006 marks the beginning of the new industry
growth stage, which we term “recent transformation.” In
the 11th Five Year Plan (FYP) (2006–2010), the government
for the first time used the term “indigenous brands” and
called for auto production capacity of at least 2 million
vehicles—50 percent from manufacturing indigenous
brands and only 10 percent would be exported (Chang,
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2016). It is also evident in the 11th FYP that Chinese
automakers would not be judged on their ability to
develop Chinese intellectual property that would relieve
reliance on foreign technology (Chang, 2016).
Indeed, high oil prices, air pollution, and China’s
commitment to reduce carbon emissions have led the
government to prioritize development of the energy
vehicle industry. Lawmakers have introduced policies and
incentives to support development of new energy vehicles
(NEVs) including electric (hybrid, plug-in, and battery), fuel
cell, and hydrogen powered (APCO Worldwide Report). In
2009, the Chinese government initiated pilot programs
in 13 cities (later expanded to 20 cities) for NEVs used for
public service purposes such as public transition, taxis,
and official business. The programs provided subsidies for
public transportation (e.g., USD 62,969 for hybrid buses)
and to support the purchase of NEVs, translating into a
price reduction for consumers. In addition, from 2010 to
2020, the central government plans to allocate more than
USD 15 billion to support (1) R&D and industrialization of
energy-efficient and new energy cars; (2) development
of NEV pilot projects; (3) promotion of hybrid electric
vehicles and other energy-saving cars; (4) development of
key components; and (5) development of electric vehicle
infrastructures in the pilot cities. It projected that three
to five key automakers will emerge with their combined
market share exceeding 60 percent. The plan also predicts
5 million NEVs will be produced, enabling China to
become the leading producer of NEVs by 2020 (APCO
Worldwide Report).
In addition to NEVs, the Chinese government has
also been heavily promoting vehicle connectivity (e.g.,
between driver and vehicle, vehicles and transportation
systems, Internet, mobile networks, and satellites) (Chang,
2016). The Internet-enabled car industry was identified
by the government as a new opportunity for domestic
automakers to become leaders in the new industry
and again reduce their reliance on foreign technology.
As a result, most of China’s leading automakers have
announced investments in Internet-enabled cars.
The government continues to adopt the helping hand
model and provides various incentives to promote NEVs,
including direct subsidies to automakers that produce
NEVs, subsidies to local government who purchases green
fleets, and tax breaks and free registration for consumers
(Chang, 2016). In fact, since the 2009 Automotive Industry
Readjustment and Revitalization Plan, the government did
12

not announce a sector-specific policy, an indicator that the
government is generally satisfied with the auto industry’s
growth (Chang, 2016). As discussed earlier, government’s
attention has shifted to specific areas of the auto industry
and has made these its top priorities. Nevertheless, the
government did exert normative pressure on Chinese
auto firms and shaped cognitive understanding of the
importance of cultivating independent innovation and
new product development capabilities for Chinese
automakers to gain leading positions and reduce reliance
on foreign technologies in new areas such as NEVs and
Internet-enabled cars.
Following these government initiatives, Chinese auto
firms, for example, Chang’an in our recent case study
(Guo et al., 2014), identified building an independent
innovation system as an important entrepreneurial
endeavor. The innovation systems were built to develop
core technologies, reconfigure available resources, and
eventually new products—important CE transformation
through innovation and continuous strategic renewal. To
support these CE initiatives, most leading Chinese auto
firms also engaged in organizational rejuvenation activities
by cultivating strong, innovation-supportive corporate
cultures and establishing a compatible human resources
management (HRM) system.

Implications and Conclusion
Our analysis based on the case study of the Chinese auto
firms and auto industry’s transformation has answered two
research questions raised at the beginning of this editorial:
(1) what roles can governments play in enabling and
stimulating firms’ CE in emerging economies and (2) what
is the impact of government involvement on important
CE outcomes, namely EMFs’ innovation, strategic renewal,
and corporate venturing? It is evident in our analysis that
the Chinese government played different roles at different
stages. During the initiation stage, government adopted
a strong grabbing hand to jumpstart the auto industry
and initiated domestic automakers’ CE transformation
through corporate venturing by forcing the 50–50 JV
partnership arrangement between Chinese and foreign
automakers. The impact of the grabbling hand model
was demonstrated in the Chinese automakers’ improved
manufacturing capabilities but it also constrained their
ability to acquire core technologies as well as marketing
and R&D capabilities, all of which are crucial for innovation
and NPD. During the rapid development and recent
transformation periods, the government adopted a
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helping hand model to provide favorable economic
incentives, policies, as well as improve the overall
infrastructure and FDI investment environment to promote
Chinese automakers’ CE transformation through strategic
renewal and innovation in NEVs and Internet-enabled
cars. The helping hand was also effective in establishing
industry norms based on government expectations and in
creating a value system to favor development of NEVs and
Internet-enabled cars.
In the Western CE literature, for instance, Dess et al.
(2003), stress the different CE roles of management at
multiple levels of the organization and emphasize the role
of top management leadership in CE. We suggest that
the argument can be extended to examine the different
roles of governments in initiating, enabling, and shaping
the CE transformation of firms in emerging economies.
It is evident that governments can serve an important

function in assisting and guiding top managers of EMFs
in identifying entrepreneurial opportunities, suggesting
innovative ideas and initiatives, offering financial and
political support for exploiting opportunities identified
by CE programs, supporting investment in building the
EMFs’ capabilities and sustained competitive advantages.
We believe the unique institutional compositions of the
emerging markets may require different research topics
that are currently underexamined in the mainstream CE
literature. To achieve this goal and to develop a better
understanding of CE-related issues, especially those
pertinent in emerging markets, we encourage all interested
scholars to submit relevant scholarly work to our special
issue on “Corporate Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets.”
After all, we need to address the critical questions of how
emerging markets are reshaping globalization.
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